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SEVERING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SEX 
TRAFFICKING AND U.S. MILITARY BASES 
OVERSEAS 
Anna Belle Hoots* 
 
The sex trafficking of women and girls by U.S. military men remains an 
issue plaguing U.S. military bases overseas.  While the U.S. government has 
offered several solutions to combat this specific niche of sex trafficking, the 
legislation and policy put forth are insufficient to eradicate the problem.  
After assessing the intersection of sex trafficking and overseas U.S. military 
bases, this Note both discusses why and proposes how, through the use of 
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), all U.S. military bases abroad can 
and must commit to the prevention of this egregious human rights violation.  
Because SOFAs grant wide latitude to set terms and foster cooperation 
between the United States and a host country, this Note proposes a 
framework for utilizing SOFAs as a channel for stricter guidelines and 
greater enforceability of sex trafficking laws, specifically through the 
inclusion of a new sex trafficking provision. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Of the past 3,400 years, humans have been entirely at peace for 268 of 
them, or just 8 percent of recorded history.”1  Perhaps this disconcerting 
statistic illuminates why the tangible fear of war remains pervasive 
throughout society.2  Indeed, such a deep-seated fear of conflict necessitates 
a means to safeguard peace, and the installation of military bases around the 
world emerged as a strategy to do so.3  As the country with the most military 
bases abroad, the United States has certainly taken advantage of this practice, 
with over 800 bases in nearly eighty foreign countries and territories,4 all 
governed by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).5 
This peacekeeping policy, however, has come at a price.  While foreign 
countries may find solace in a permanent U.S. presence,6 the benefits of 
 
 1. Chris Hedges, What Every Person Should Know About War, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 
2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/06/books/chapters/what-every-person-should-
know-about-war.html [https://perma.cc/Y4JS-H275]. 
 2. See Lily Rothman, Why Americans Are More Afraid Than They Used To Be, TIME 
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://time.com/4158007/american-fear-history [https://perma.cc/VGG5-
2WMQ]. 
 3. See MICHAEL J. LOSTUMBO ET AL., RAND, OVERSEAS BASING OF U.S. MILITARY 
FORCES:  AN ASSESSMENT OF RELATIVE COSTS AND STRATEGIC BENEFITS xxi–xxii (2013), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR201/RAND_RR20
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGG9-J4KC]. 
 4. See Cameron Orr, Peace Movement Reviving to Challenge U.S.’ Empire of Foreign 
Bases, PEOPLE’S WORLD (Apr. 10, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/ 
peace-movement-reviving-to-challenge-u-s-empire-of-foreign-bases/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2FZR-93SX]. 
 5. See INT’L SEC. ADVISORY BD., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON STATUS OF FORCES 
AGREEMENTS 1 (2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JMD6-E54E] (“[SOFAs] define the legal status of U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) personnel, activities, and property in the territory of another nation and set 
forth rights and responsibilities between the United States and the host government.”). 
 6. See LOSTUMBO ET AL., supra note 3, at xxi–xxiii. 
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American troops on their soil are being eclipsed by concerns over the human 
rights abuses linked with these U.S. bases,7 particularly sex trafficking.8 
A subset of human trafficking, sex trafficking is often equated with 
modern-day slavery;9 it also remains the most common form of human 
trafficking and disproportionately affects women and girls.10  Statistics 
estimate that sex trafficking generates billions of dollars of profit per year,11 
turning it into an extremely lucrative industry.  But sex trafficking is a crime, 
and one that often goes unnoticed.12  Indeed, victims are frequently reluctant 
to come forward for a myriad of reasons, including “[l]anguage barriers, fear 
of their traffickers, and/or fear of law enforcement.”13 
A grave violation of human rights, sex trafficking is prohibited under both 
domestic and international law.14  Recognizing the prevalence of sex 
trafficking touching overseas U.S. military bases, the U.S. government 
increased its anti-trafficking efforts by implementing training programs and 
developing new policies and procedures for the military, civilian employees, 
and contractors.15  After all, these bases—established to promote peace—
should not be a source for activity that produces human suffering.  While 
U.S. efforts are not futile, the issue is far from resolved.16  Illicit sexual 
 
 7. See Alice Slater, The US Has Military Bases in 80 Countries.  All of Them Must Close., 
NATION (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-us-has-military-bases-in-172-
countries-all-of-them-must-close [https://perma.cc/A3FR-XPYP]. 
 8. See Lindsey Posmanick, The Department of Defense’s Strategic Approach to Human 
Trafficking, HUM. TRAFFICKING CTR. (Apr. 19, 2018), http://humantraffickingcenter.org/the-
department-of-defenses-strategic-approach-to-human-trafficking [https://perma.cc/U7JZ-
BR6M]. 
 9. See What Is Modern Slavery?, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/what-is-modern-
slavery [https://perma.cc/W3TV-HC2N] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 10. As of 2014, 51 percent of victims are women and another 20 percent are girls. See 
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2016, at 23, 
U.N. Sales No. E.16.IV.6 (2016). 
 11. See What Is Human Trafficking?, HUM. TRAFFICKING CTR., https:// 
humantraffickingcenter.org/problem [https://perma.cc/CFE3-FUK8] (last visited Oct. 6, 
2019). 
 12. See What Is Human Trafficking?, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https:// 
www.dhs.gov/blue-campaign/what-human-trafficking [https://perma.cc/Z82Y-FV4S] (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See G.A. Res. 55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000); see also G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Nov. 
15, 2000) [hereinafter Palermo Protocol] (providing a universal definition of human 
trafficking).  To meet the universal definition, “three key elements” must be present:  “(i) 
action (recruitment, . . . ); (ii) means (threat, . . . ); and (iii) purpose (exploitation).” OFFICE OF 
THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING:  FACT 
SHEET NO. 36, at 3 (2014), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS36_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KF6K-KLWK].  When the exploitation of an individual is sexual in nature, 
then, it is considered a situation of sex trafficking. See id. 
 15. See Posmanick, supra note 8 (noting that “the U.S. military adopted a zero-tolerance 
policy” following the issuance of National Security Presidential Directive 22 (NSPD 22), 
which “instruct[ed] federal agencies and the DoD, to strengthen their anti-trafficking efforts”). 
 16. See id. 
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activities between male U.S. soldiers and women and girls17 abroad occur to 
this day, continuing the troubling pattern that has persisted for decades.18 
Part I provides relevant background material about the emergence and 
purposes of U.S. military bases overseas and SOFAs and outlines the types 
of SOFAs the United States holds with various nations.  It also delves into 
the history of sex trafficking involving U.S. military personnel assigned to 
foreign bases. 
Part II focuses on U.S. attempts to attenuate this connection through 
specific policies and legislation.  In analyzing the strengths and weaknesses 
of these laws, Part II demonstrates the inability of such policies and 
legislation to fully address the sex trafficking predicament around U.S. 
military bases.  Additionally, this section presents a case study of the sex 
trafficking of women and girls around U.S. military bases in South Korea, 
highlighting the U.S. and South Korean governments’ sovereign complicity 
in establishing and fueling the exploitation of women and girls for the sexual 
gratification of U.S. soldiers.  This case study both illustrates how existing 
U.S. legislation is ineffective and exemplifies the need for a nuanced and 
targeted legal solution. 
Part III then presents a resolution to the issue of sex trafficking around 
U.S. military bases abroad.  Acknowledging that the United States alone 
cannot conquer this issue, this Note proposes a cooperative framework 
utilizing SOFAs—specifically concerning jurisdiction to prosecute crimes—
between the United States and host countries to restrict sex trafficking by 
U.S. military personnel.  SOFAs allow for wide latitude to set terms and 
foster cooperation between nations and should be used as a channel for 
stricter guidelines and greater enforceability of sex trafficking laws through 
the incorporation of provisions that implement the proposed cooperative 
framework. 
I.  A (S)TALE(MATE) AS OLD AS TIME 
Part I discusses the history of U.S. military bases overseas and explains 
the rationale behind the creation of SOFAs.  The United States has entered 
into these agreements—of which there are many types—to primarily address 
the jurisdictional issues that arise out of the placement of bases on foreign 
soil.  This section thus describes the existing jurisdictional frameworks 
between the United States and host countries in SOFAs.  In addition, Part I 
provides an overview of the connection between sex trafficking and U.S. 
military bases overseas. 
 
 17. Sex trafficking affects all genders.  This Note, however, focuses solely on the sex 
trafficking of women and girl victims by male U.S. soldiers. 
 18. See David Vine, Women’s Labor, Sex Work and U.S. Military Bases Abroad, SALON 
(Oct. 8, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2017/10/08/womens-labor-sex-work-and-
u-s-military-bases-abroad [https://perma.cc/3C5J-U8YA] (“Throughout history, women’s sex 
work has been used to help make male troops happy—or at least happy enough to keep 
working for the military.”). 
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A.  The History of Overseas U.S. Military Bases and SOFAs 
The establishment of overseas U.S. military bases dates back to the 
Spanish-American War when the United States installed its first permanent 
bases in the Far East and the Caribbean.19  Thereafter, U.S. military presence 
abroad remained small.20  It was only after World Wars I and II that U.S. 
overseas military bases experienced extreme growth; indeed, they began to 
resemble their present-day setup and became “a more acceptable reality” for 
all nations.21 
As U.S. military bases overseas grew more common, so too did conflicts 
implicating state sovereignty.22  The SOFA emerged as the resolution.23  
SOFAs, which are “multilateral or bilateral agreements that generally 
establish the framework under which a state’s military forces can operate in 
a foreign country,”24 include numerous provisions25 but primarily govern 
civil and criminal jurisdiction over bases and personnel.26  Following the 
implementation of SOFAs, questions regarding state sovereignty have 
greatly diminished and the establishment of U.S. military bases abroad has 
become more regulated.27 
B.  The United States and SOFAs 
The United States has more overseas military bases than any other 
nation.28  Consequently, the United States is a party to more than one hundred 
SOFAs.29  Around half of these agreements fall under the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) SOFA or the Partnership for Peace30 SOFA, 
 
 19. See Addalyrica Q. George, US Military Overseas Bases—How They Began and the 
Enduring Need for Forward Based United States’ Troops . . ., at 7 (Apr. 6, 2017) (unpublished 
report), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038289.pdf [https://perma.cc/SUJ3-8XV4]. 
 20. See id. at 8–9. 
 21. Bruna dos Santos Lersch & Josiane Simão Sarti, The Establishment of Foreign 
Military Bases and the International Distribution of Power, 2 UFRGS MODEL UNITED 
NATIONS J. 83, 85 (2014). 
 22. See id. at 88 (“‘Sovereignty . . . has been described as a right to exercise therein, to 
the exclusion of any other state, the function of a state . . . .’  In other words, the principle of 
sovereignty of a state clashes with the implementation of military bases belonging to other 
countr[ies] inside another one’s territory.” (quoting Geert van Calster, International Law and 
Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 105 
(Aaron Schwabach & Arthur John Cockfield eds., 2009))); see also Andrew I. Yeo, Security, 
Sovereignty, and Justice in U.S. Overseas Military Presence, INT’L J. PEACE STUD., Winter 
2014, at 43, 43–44 (“From Spain and Portugal to South Korea and the Philippines, dozens of 
host governments that signed basing or status of forces agreements (SOFAs) with the U.S. 
during the early Cold War years, negotiated for greater sovereignty rights over time.”). 
 23. See Lersch & Sarti, supra note 21, at 88. 
 24. Id. at 89. 
 25. See id. (“[O]ther provisions dealing with subjects such as taxes and fees, test-ranges 
for weaponry and number of troops are also included in the SOFA’s scope.”). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 88–89. 
 28. See Orr, supra note 4. 
 29. See INT’L SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 5, at 1. 
 30. See id.; see also R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34531, STATUS OF 
FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA):  WHAT IS IT, AND HOW HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 2 (2012) (“The 
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whereas the rest are either comprehensive or less comprehensive agreements 
formed through negotiations with long-standing U.S. allies or other nations.31  
Indeed, existing SOFAs differ immensely and are shaped according to 
negotiations because there is no formal document that promulgates 
international guidelines for these agreements.32  Notwithstanding SOFA 
diversity, civil and criminal jurisdiction remain the most foundational aspects 
of these agreements.33  While each SOFA’s jurisdictional framework often 
encompasses both civil and criminal matters,34 this Note focuses on the more 
contentious issue of criminal jurisdiction, specifically as it relates to sex 
trafficking. 
Although the majority of U.S. SOFAs provide for “shared jurisdiction 
between the United States and the [host] country,” there exist agreements 
pursuant to which the United States retains exclusive jurisdiction.35  In 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements, the United States has the power to exercise 
“all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction” over U.S. military personnel who 
violate the laws of either the United States or the host country.36  Shared 
jurisdiction, on the other hand, grants the United States and the host country 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain offenses, typically according to which 
country punishes the offense.37  Under these circumstances, “the country 
whose law has been offended has exclusive jurisdiction over the offender.”38  
If U.S. personnel break the laws of both the United States and the host 
country, “additional qualifications are used to” decide which country retains 
the right to exercise jurisdiction.39 
Most U.S. SOFAs require the United States to relinquish “primary 
jurisdiction”40 in criminal cases to the host country with two exceptions:  (1) 
“[w]hen the offense is committed by Americans against Americans (‘inter 
se’ cases)” and (2) “when the offense is committed by Americans in carrying 
out official duty.”41  These exceptions give the United States primary 
 
NATO SOFA is a multilateral agreement that has applicability among all the member 
countries of NATO. . . .  Additionally, another 24 countries are subject to the NATO SOFA 
through their participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.  The program 
consists of bilateral cooperation between individual countries and NATO to increase stability, 
diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships.” (footnote omitted)). 
 31. See INT’L SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 5, at 1–3 (detailing the variation among 
SOFAs between the United States and other countries). 
 32. See Lersch & Sarti, supra note 21, at 89. 
 33. See MASON, supra note 30, at 3. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. at 5. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Primary jurisdiction gives the host country power to exercise jurisdiction for all cases 
in which U.S. military personnel violate its laws. See Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA], 
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sofa.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/2M56-9DW6] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 41. Id.; see, e.g., Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding 
the Status of Their Forces art. 7.3, June 19, 1951, 4.2 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 
[hereinafter NATO SOFA]. 
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jurisdiction over its accused military members.42  In addition to the stated 
exceptions, the shared jurisdiction regime requires the host country to 
consider any U.S. requests for the host country to waive its primary 
jurisdiction.43  In general, the United States has the right to exert jurisdiction 
over criminal activity of U.S. personnel both on and off base, which can 
completely immunize a military member from the host country’s laws.44  
Through SOFA provisions governing jurisdiction, the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) is able “to protect, to the maximum extent possible, the rights 
of United States personnel who may be subject to criminal trial by foreign 
courts and imprisonment in foreign prisons.”45 
C.  The Connection Between Sex Trafficking and U.S. Military Bases 
Overseas:  An Overview 
The link between sex trafficking and U.S. military bases overseas is not a 
new phenomenon.46  To this day, U.S. military personnel frequent bars off 
base and out of uniform where women and girls are trafficked into forced 
prostitution.47  These individuals have fallen victim to sex trafficking through 
a variety of means, from being manipulated by a loved one to being baited 
with false pretenses such as a job.48  Victims are most frequently found in 
fake massage businesses, residential brothels, bars, and strip clubs.49  Despite 
both this reality and the high number of estimated victims and cases 
worldwide, prosecution rates in sex trafficking cases remain low.50  This 
shocking disparity may stem partly from the victims’ shame and fear of 
coming forward or, more generally, from a lack of good enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Efforts to crack down on human trafficking began when President Bill 
Clinton signed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 200051 (TVPA), 
“the first comprehensive federal law” designed to address trafficking in 
 
 42. See Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA], supra note 40. 
 43. See, e.g., NATO SOFA, supra note 41, 4.2 U.S.T. at 1800, 199 U.N.T.S. at 76–78. 
 44. See MASON, supra note 30, at 3–5. 
 45. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5525.1, STATUS OF FORCES POLICY AND INFORMATION 
2 (1979), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/552501p.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9UA8-RGH2]. 
 46. See Vine, supra note 18; see also Dan Lamothe, The U.S. Military’s Long, 
Uncomfortable History with Prostitution Gets New Attention, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/10/31/the-u-s-militarys-long-
uncomfortable-history-with-prostitution-gets-new-attention [https://perma.cc/D49G-X4F6]. 
 47. See Posmanick, supra note 8. 
 48. These jobs are often disguised as modeling or dancing careers. See, e.g., Sex 
Trafficking, POLARIS, https://polarisproject.org/human-trafficking/sex-trafficking [https:// 
perma.cc/RH2R-Q7WJ] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 49. See id.; Hostess/Strip Club-Based, NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING HOTLINE, https:// 
humantraffickinghotline.org/sex-trafficking-venuesindustries/hostessstrip-club-based 
[https://perma.cc/69KK-WM7U] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 50. See Human Trafficking by the Numbers, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Jan. 7, 2017), https:// 
www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/human-trafficking-numbers [https://perma.cc/CXG6-
GQYZ]. 
 51. See Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. A, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.). 
740 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
persons.52  While additional strategies and legislation designed to correct this 
problem have since been formed and passed,53 there is a gap between these 
policies as written and as practiced.  Considering not only the continued 
prevalence of U.S. military bases worldwide but also their entrenchment in 
society,54 the deplorable connection between U.S. military bases overseas 
and sex trafficking has faced considerably less scrutiny than it deserves. 
II.  LAW AND (DIS)ORDER 
The U.S. government has attempted to curb sex trafficking around U.S. 
military bases abroad through policies and legislation aimed at both the 
general population at large and military personnel specifically.  Part II.A 
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of these laws and explains why—
despite improvement—they fall short of adequately addressing the sex 
trafficking crisis around U.S. military bases.  Part II.B then presents a case 
study of the sex trafficking of women and girls around U.S. military bases in 
South Korea.  By visiting bars and clubs where women and girls are 
trafficked into forced prostitution, U.S. personnel stationed in South Korea 
knowingly perpetuate the vicious sex trade cycle.  In recent years, both the 
U.S. and South Korean governments have attempted to remedy the issue to 
no avail.  U.S. military personnel in South Korea will continue to participate 
in the sex trade until a viable resolution is created and enforced. 
A.  The U.S. Government’s Attempts to Curb Sex Trafficking Around U.S. 
Overseas Military Bases 
Tasked with the responsibility of keeping the United States safe and 
secure, the U.S. government—specifically the DoD—oversees a vast 
military.55  As commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president is the 
ultimate authority for military operations,56 but the DoD is authorized to 
ensure that military personnel abide by the law and ethics of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)—the statutory framework of the military 
justice system.57  It is important to distinguish, however, that while the 
UCMJ outlines the substantive law governing the conduct of all military 
 
 52. Federal Law, NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING HOTLINE, https:// 
humantraffickinghotline.org/what-human-trafficking/federal-law [https://perma.cc/E237-
ZKZL] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 53. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 54. See, e.g., Joseph Hincks, Inside Camp Humphreys, South Korea:  America’s Largest 
Overseas Military Base, TIME (July 12, 2018), http://time.com/5324575/us-camp-humphreys-
south-korea-largest-military-base/ [https://perma.cc/YJD2-6BAN]. 
 55. See generally Department of Defense, PERFORMANCE.GOV, https:// 
www.performance.gov/defense/defense.html [https://perma.cc/FP6J-W7NS] (last updated 
Sept. 19, 2019). 
 56. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 57. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2012); The Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), MILITARY, https://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/ 
the-uniform-code-of-military-justice-ucmj.html [https://perma.cc/8CTU-NWK4] (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2019) (“The UCMJ defines the military justice system and lists criminal offenses under 
military law.”). 
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personnel, a SOFA outlines civil and criminal personal jurisdiction over 
personnel stationed overseas.58 
In recent years, the DoD has denounced sex trafficking in the harshest 
terms.59  Together with presidential leadership and various federal agencies, 
the DoD has enacted a “multi-pronged anti-trafficking approach” to prohibit 
military personnel from eliciting sexual services.60  Their combined efforts 
certainly paid off in late 2005, when patronizing prostitution and pandering 
became a “specific, chargeable offense” under Article 134 of the UCMJ.61 
Notwithstanding this provision, the United States still faces challenges in 
preventing and prosecuting sex trafficking crimes around U.S. military bases 
under the current legislative framework.  The merits and limitations of 
legislation designed to address this issue are discussed in turn. 
1.  The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 
On October 28, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the TVPA into law,62 
symbolizing the U.S. effort to spearhead the eradication of trafficking both 
domestically and worldwide.63  Designed to “ensure just and effective 
punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims,”64 the TVPA prohibits 
various forms of human trafficking and creates resources for its elimination 
through three methods:  protection, prosecution, and prevention.65  The U.S. 
Department of State recently introduced a “4th P” to the “3P” paradigm—
partnership—emphasizing the importance of cooperation within the 
government and the international community.66 
At the time of the TVPA’s passage, members of the international 
community, including the United States, had just finished drafting the 
Palermo Protocol, which clearly defined sex trafficking67 and provided for 
 
 58. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 59. See, e.g., Terri Moon Cronk, Human Trafficking Has No Place in DoD, Pentagon 
Official Says, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/ 
1414057/human-trafficking-has-no-place-in-dod-pentagon-official-says [https://perma.cc/ 
DJR5-X92W]. 
 60. See Trafficking in Persons and International Military Organizations, U.S. DEP’T ST. 
(Feb. 22, 2007), https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/07/82340.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
X73D-RLGW]. 
 61. Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13,387, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,697, 60,701 (Oct. 14, 2005). 
 62. See Summary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and Reauthorizations 
FY 2017, ALLIANCE TO END SLAVERY & TRAFFICKING (Jan. 11, 2017, 8:40 AM), https:// 
endslaveryandtrafficking.org/summary-trafficking-victims-protection-act-tvpa-
reauthorizations-fy-2017-2/ [https://perma.cc/X5VR-FX9F]. 
 63. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012); see also Brittany Lieu, A Policy Analysis of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, at 34 (May 2014) (unpublished M.S.W. 
dissertation, California State University, Long Beach), https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/ 
pubnum/1527722.html?FMT=AI [https://perma.cc/F78K-XCTX]. 
 64. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a). 
 65. See 3Ps:  Prosecution, Protection, and Prevention, U.S. DEP’T ST., 
https://www.state.gov/3ps-prosecution-protection-and-prevention [https://perma.cc/G8TF-
Q5PK] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
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 67. See Palermo Protocol, supra note 14, at 42–43 (“(a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall 
mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of 
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its criminalization.68  The TVPA both implemented the protocol and filled 
gaps in U.S. law.69  The scope of the Act, nevertheless, reaches far beyond 
the United States.70  In outlining minimum standards that each government 
in countries of “origin, transit, or destination” should implement,71 the U.S. 
government sought to eliminate sex trafficking on a global scale.72 
Efforts to combat sex trafficking have undoubtedly accelerated since the 
TVPA’s enactment.73  Most notably, there has been a measurable increase in 
prosecutions—a critical anti-trafficking effort.74  Prosecutions not only lead 
to the punishment of the offense of exploiting other human beings but also 
improve deterrence.75  In the years preceding the TVPA, sentences for sex 
trafficking were weak penalties that did not reflect the gravity of the crime.76  
Upon the Act’s passage, anyone caught trafficking an individual who was 
induced by force, fraud, or coercion for purposes of commercial sex could be 
fined and imprisoned for life, depending on the severity of the offense.77  
From 2011 to 2015, the number of sex trafficking suspects referred to U.S. 
attorneys for prosecution increased 82 percent.78  In 2015 alone, U.S. 
attorneys prosecuted 1049 suspects for human trafficking offenses—a 44 
percent increase from the 729 suspects prosecuted in 2011—and almost all 
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or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; (b) The consent of a victim 
of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article 
shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used . . . .”). 
 68. See Michelle Madden Dempsey et al., Defining Sex Trafficking in International and 
Domestic Law:  Mind the Gaps, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 137, 138 (2012). 
 69. See Summary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and Reauthorizations 
FY 2017, supra note 62. 
 70. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 7106–7107 (2012) (explaining that governments of other countries 
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trafficking. See id. 
 72. See id. § 7107.  To ensure compliance, the United States forfeits any form of financial 
assistance—excepting humanitarian and trade-related aid—to governments that fail to meet 
the minimum standards. See id.  Despite U.S. intentions, it remains unclear whether the 
minimum standard provisions truly have any bite. See generally Janie Chuang, The United 
States as Global Sheriff:  Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 437 (2006). 
 73. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
crt/legacy/2010/12/14/tvpaanniversaryreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7C2-CYWT]. 
 74. See id. at 5–8; Lieu, supra note 63, at 43–44. 
 75. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 73, at 5. 
 76. See Lieu, supra note 63, at 32–34. 
 77. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 7102(9)(a), 7109. 
 78. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Human Trafficking Prosecutions 
Increased More Than 40 Percent from 2011 to 2015 (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fphtc15pr.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XWS-UBJ3] (“This 
report presents statistics on . . . human trafficking offenses covered by the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2000 and Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015.”). 
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of the convicted defendants received a prison sentence, with a median term 
of fifteen years.79 
The TVPA’s anti-trafficking efforts also gleaned success through 
Congress’s creation of T nonimmigrant status (T visa).80  From a protection 
standpoint, the T visa has been crucial in providing refuge for victims of sex 
trafficking around the world.81  By allowing sex trafficking victims and their 
immediate family members to remain and work temporarily in the United 
States—typically if they agree to help law enforcement prosecute the 
perpetrators—these survivors gain legal nonimmigrant status and are eligible 
to receive federal benefits.82  This accessible grant of protection can offer a 
much-needed fresh start for victims.  Indeed, the number of T visa applicants 
has steadily increased over the years since 2008.83  Between 2008 and 2015, 
6087 victims applied for T visas; of those, 4305 applicants were approved.84 
Despite significant progress in combatting sex trafficking, weaknesses in 
the TVPA have yet to be addressed.  Since 2000, Congress reauthorized the 
TVPA in 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013, and 2017 with modifications.85  These 
changes were intended to reflect what the original TVPA did not account 
for.86  Yet what the TVPA lacked, and still lacks, is the ability to counteract 
the sex trafficking of women and girls by U.S. military personnel off base, 
where the criminal activity actually takes place.  Whereas trafficking crimes 
that occur on base are prosecutable through the TVPA and UCMJ, off-base 
offenses are not.87  If the TVPA’s mission truly were to eliminate sex 
trafficking worldwide, its failure to even acknowledge this problem would 
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 80. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b); Lieu, supra note 63, at 43. 
 81. See Lieu, supra note 63, at 44. 
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announced that persons who are denied a T visa will immediately be placed in removal 
(deportation) proceedings. See Daniel Shoer Roth, The U.S. Now Has Even More Leeway to 
Start Deportation Proceedings for Immigrants, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 15, 2018, 2:08 PM), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article221655960.html 
[https://perma.cc/2MPG-RCD9].  The new measure took effect on November 19, 2018. See 
id.  Statistics have yet to be released reflecting any decline in number of T visa applicants. 
 84. See Applications for T Nonimmigrant Status, supra note 83. 
 85. See Summary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and Reauthorizations 
FY 2017, supra note 62 (discussing the evolution of the TVPA since its enactment in 2002). 
 86. See id. 
 87. Under existing SOFAs, the United States does not have jurisdiction to prosecute sex 
trafficking offenses that occur on foreign soil off base unless the host country waives its 
primary jurisdiction. See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., NATO 
SOFA, supra note 41, 4.2 U.S.T. at 1800, 199 U.N.T.S. at 76–78. 
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be a huge oversight.  Perhaps the issue requires a customized solution beyond 
the relative generality of the TVPA.88 
2.  National Security Presidential Directive 22 
On December 16, 2002, President George W. Bush—in his role as 
commander in chief—issued National Security Presidential Directive 22 
(NSPD 22), which orders federal agencies to improve and build upon their 
current anti-trafficking efforts.89  Declaring the United States’ commitment 
“to the eradication of human trafficking both domestically and abroad,” the 
U.S. government took another step towards severing the link between sex 
trafficking and U.S. overseas military bases.90  NSPD 22 established a “zero-
tolerance” policy towards trafficking in persons among members of the U.S. 
armed forces,91 aptly adopting a narrowly tailored approach to eliminate a 
specific niche of sex trafficking. 
In NSPD 22, the president directs all relevant U.S. government agencies, 
including the DoD, to develop a strategic plan to combat trafficking in 
persons abroad.92  This includes efforts to raise awareness about and 
eliminate sex trafficking through mandated training.93  NSPD 22 also 
enforces the law against those who knowingly participate in and patronize 
trafficking networks.94  As explained in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 2200.01, 
which implements NSPD 22, trafficking in persons not only violates U.S. 
law and human rights but also thwarts the DoD’s core values.95 
Passing NSPD 22 has resulted in several noteworthy victories for the 
DoD.96  In 2015, 90 percent of military members and civilian employees 
participated in human trafficking awareness training, an increase of 18 
 
 88. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
(CTIP) 2014–2018, at 5–6, https://ctip.defense.gov/Portals/12/Documents/Strategic_Plan_ 
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4G5-JNUB] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (“The TVPA and its 
several reauthorizations . . . stress the role governments can play in eradicating trafficking in 
persons in all aspects, ranging from incorporating mandatory ‘zero-tolerance’ anti-trafficking 
clauses into all government contracts, to empowering vulnerable populations by informing 
them of their rights under both national and local laws.”) (emphasis added)). 
 89. See National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-22, Memorandum from the 
President on Combating Trafficking in Persons 1 (Dec. 16, 2002), https://ctip.defense.gov/ 
Portals/12/Documents/NSPD-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EBH-6SQM] [hereinafter NSPD]. 
 90. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Trafficking in Persons 
National Security Presidential Directive (Feb. 25, 2003), https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030225.html [https://perma.cc/F8J3-
SYHR ]. 
 91. See NSPD, supra note 89, at 4. 
 92. See id. at 3. 
 93. See id. at 4. 
 94. See id. at 2. 
 95. DoDI 2200.01—which has been reissued three times since 2007—states that DoD 
opposes prostitution, forced labor, and any related activities contributing to the phenomenon 
of trafficking in persons. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2200.01:  COMBATING 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (CTIP) (2017), https://ctip.defense.gov/Portals/12/Documents/ 
DoDI%20220001p.pdf?ver=2018-02-23-112018-570 [https://perma.cc/KC9A-XNPZ]. 
 96. See generally Combating Trafficking in Persons, U.S. DEP’T DEF., https:// 
ctip.defense.gov [https://perma.cc/NS8R-P94P] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
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percent from 2008.97  DoD personnel are now better equipped to recognize 
and report signs of trafficking both on and off base, which in turn has 
increased identification of trafficking victims.98  Further, establishments 
suspected of involvement with prostitution and human trafficking have been 
placed off-limits to U.S. personnel.99  Working with local governments and 
law enforcement, the DoD has attempted to curtail U.S. troops’ patronage of 
these establishments and, as a result, tighten its zero-tolerance policy.100 
Much like the TVPA, however, NSPD 22 needs considerable refinement.  
Notwithstanding heightened awareness and stricter policy, investigations 
into sex trafficking crimes around U.S. military bases abroad suggest that 
something more is required.101  In fact, the DoD’s continued efforts to adopt 
new and improved approaches to NSPD 22—like the Strategic Action Plan—
corroborate this proposition.102 
3.  The DoD’s Strategic Action Plan 
In 2014, the DoD issued its five-year Strategic Action Plan to end human 
trafficking, supplementing NSPD 22.103  Created by the Combating 
Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Program, the Strategic Action Plan responded 
to an investigative report by the Office of Inspector General, which found the 
DoD’s compliance with DoDI 2200.01 inadequate.104  In adopting the 
report’s recommendations, the U.S. military has utilized the Strategic Action 
Plan to combat sex trafficking over the past several years.105 
While merely a vision, the Strategic Action Plan has come closer to 
addressing the problem of sex trafficking around military bases overseas than 
the TVPA and NSPD 22.  Indeed, the plan’s first-listed guiding principle is 
the “[reduction of] risk and incidence of trafficking in persons within DoD’s 
garrison and deployed military operations.”106  Highlighting a neglected 
problem area, the Strategic Action Plan provides a roadmap for what needs 
to be done to reduce trafficking in persons in the twenty-first century, 
including around military bases overseas.107 
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 98. See id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
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 105. See Posmanick, supra note 8. 
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The Strategic Action Plan’s objectives generally revolve around improved 
partnership—the “4th P”—and with good reason.108  As a global issue, sex 
trafficking cannot be fought solely by one country, especially when it 
involves the interests of two or more.  The United States therefore recognizes 
the importance of cooperation with other countries and government agencies 
as a foundation for preventing trafficking.109  The Strategic Action Plan 
defines the DoD’s duty to understand the host country’s local laws because 
“improved mutual understanding will enable joint programs and law 
enforcement efforts.”110  Although a step in the right direction, the Strategic 
Action Plan lacks implementation procedures and is thus ineffective.111  
Indeed, the DoD has yet to publish an implementation plan that sets its vision 
in motion, and a plan without implementation is merely aspirational. 
Overall, the United States has taken great strides in combating sex 
trafficking since enacting the TVPA.  Upon the recognition of the U.S. 
military as a contributing source, the United States began to pursue 
legislation specifically targeting the sex trafficking of women and girls by 
male U.S. military personnel stationed overseas.112  Despite increased 
awareness of and additional policies concerning the issue, the U.S. 
government has yet to create and implement a permanent solution.  What has 
instead resulted from the TVPA, NSPD 22, and Strategic Action Plan is a 
collective blueprint for eliminating sex trafficking around U.S. military bases 
abroad that lacks enforceability. 
B.  A Case Study of South Korea 
To highlight the inadequacies of existing frameworks, this section explores 
a country notorious for the commingling of U.S. military personnel and 
prostitutes:  South Korea.  Because sex trafficking around U.S. military bases 
has deep roots in South Korea, this subsection provides a concrete example 
of the ongoing human rights violations being committed against women and 
girls who are forced into prostitution.  Additionally, this section surveys the 
efforts of the U.S. and South Korean governments to curtail sex trafficking, 
as well as more recent developments concerning this issue. 
   
 
 108. Id. at 5. 
 109. See id. at 3. 
 110. Id. at 11. 
 111. See id. at 3. 
 112. See supra Parts II.A.1–3. 
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1.  The Beginnings of Sex Trafficking Around U.S. Military Bases in South 
Korea 
Women like me were the biggest sacrifice for my country’s alliance with 
the Americans.  Looking back, I think my body was not mine, but the 
government’s and the U.S. military’s. 
—Anonymous sex worker113 
Beginning in 1945,114 American soldiers stationed in Korea turned to 
prostitution for comfort from both loneliness and the terrors of war.115  Both 
the U.S. and South Korean governments shamelessly condoned this 
behavior.116  By setting up “comfort stations” in camptowns—prostitution 
camps that catered to U.S. forces—compelling “entertaining girls” to be 
checked and treated for sexually transmitted diseases, and providing sex 
workers the opportunity to learn English and etiquette, these governments 
jointly fueled the sex industry.117 
As South Korea struggled to emerge from war, prostitution became 
integral to the country’s economic revitalization.118  Following the signing 
of the 1953 mutual defense treaty, camptowns flourished.119  “By 1958, there 
were an estimated 300,000 sex workers in a country with an entire population 
of just 22 million,” more than half of whom worked in camptowns.120  These 
South Korean sex workers relied almost entirely on U.S. military personnel 
for their livelihoods, often remaining in camptowns for the duration of their 
lives with no opportunity to escape.121  Another popular practice among U.S. 
soldiers during this time was “cohabitating marriage,” which was nothing 
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Ever since the split, the United States has maintained a military presence in South Korea, 
founded on a 1953 mutual defense treaty. See U.S. Relations with the Republic of Korea, U.S. 
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V87L-NRPY]. 
 115. See WITW Staff, supra note 113. 
 116. See id. 
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more than sex slavery.122  Whereas some sex workers would come and go 
from the camptown as part of a routine, others were owned by G.I.s, living 
with them permanently.123  In the latter circumstance, when the G.I. 
eventually left South Korea, he would simply sell the sex worker to a new 
recruit.124  But regardless of whether a sex worker was in a cohabitating 
marriage or “free” to come and go, the woman lacked any control or 
autonomy. 
Conditions worsened when a military junta usurped the South Korean 
government in a 1961 coup d’etat.125  Shortly thereafter, Korean officials 
designated “special districts” for businesses catering to U.S. troops.126  These 
legally recognized districts were strictly off-limits to Koreans, and American 
military police dominated the districts, allowing prostitution to run 
rampant.127  By 1965, “85 percent of [G.I.s] surveyed reported having ‘been 
with’ or ‘been out with’ a prostitute.”128 
Ultimately, a stunt so clear in the public eye could not avoid scrutiny.  In 
recent years, investigations into and exposés on this stark reality have 
revealed the openly intertwined nature of prostitution and American military 
bases overseas, inducing both the U.S. and South Korean governments to 
clamp down on the industry;129 for example, South Korea outlawed 
prostitution in 2004.130  Instead of disappearing, however, prostitution has 
only become more shrouded in secrecy.131 
2.  The Current Trend of Sex Trafficking Around U.S. Military Bases in 
South Korea 
In the mid-1990s, South Korea underwent a period of rapid economic 
development, allowing many Korean women to both escape and stay out of 
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given names such as ‘the monkey house.’”). 
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 130. See Vine, supra note 119. 
 131. See id. 
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prostitution.132  But where there is demand, there will always be supply.  
Indeed, “one of the many legacies of conflict has been South Korea becoming 
a destination for trafficked women, and the sex industry continues to hold a 
poisonous grip on the nation.”133  South Korea’s camptowns now consist 
primarily of women from Russia and the Philippines134 who enter the country 
on entertainment visas.135  Lured to South Korea under false pretenses,136 
these women often emigrate in anticipation of a lucrative job and stability 
but are instead forced to engage in prostitution at “juicy bars.”137  Caught 
between a rock and a hard place, the women must either risk being arrested 
and deported or endure the abuse since there is a slim chance that an 
American soldier will marry them out of prostitution.138 
The U.S. and South Korean governments ultimately faced growing 
criticism and pressure for change, which led to several positive developments 
concerning sex trafficking.  In 2004, South Korea not only outlawed 
prostitution139 but also passed the Act on the Prevention of Commercial Sex 
Acts and Protection, etc. of Victims, which further regulated the sex 
industry.140  Together, the two new laws recognized prostitution as a 
violation of women’s human rights and demanded its total elimination.141  
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translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online database, https:// 
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Effectuate the Legislature’s Intent to Protect Prostitutes from Abuse, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 
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Following suit, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)142 began to seriously implement 
NSPD 22’s zero-tolerance policy, developing a CTIP program that focused 
on “increasing awareness, identifying victims, reducing demand, and 
cooperating with local authorities.”143  USFK’s comprehensive CTIP 
program eventually became a prototype for NATO’s anti-trafficking training 
curriculum,144 a testament to its exemplary nature.  Additionally, USFK is 
cited as a model in the Strategic Action Plan for its great willingness to 
cooperate with local authorities on matters relating to sex trafficking.145  To 
access information concerning trends in the sex trade industry, USFK 
interacts directly with the South Korean government and the Women and 
Juveniles Division of the Korean National Police, demonstrating the level of 
intergovernmental and interagency cooperation needed to effectively address 
the matter.146 
In addition to legislative changes, the Seoul Central District Court recently 
conceded its government’s heavy involvement in the sex trafficking of 
Korean women for U.S. personnel.147  In 2014, more than 120 prostitutes 
who were detained and forced to undergo treatment for venereal diseases 
filed a lawsuit seeking not only compensation but also a formal government 
apology for what they faced in the 1960s and 1970s.148  Sharing her 
experience, one former comfort woman explained, “[i]t’s clear that they 
treated our venereal diseases not for us but for the American soldiers.”149  
The court in 2017 ultimately admitted to the government’s complicity.150  
Hailed as a landmark ruling, this decision was the first official 
acknowledgement that the legal rights of the women who supplied sexual 
services to American military men were violated.151  Although only fifty-
seven of the plaintiffs received compensation and the government refused to 
issue an apology, the court’s ruling was a step in the right direction for 
justice.152 
Notwithstanding these victories, sex trafficking around U.S. bases has not 
ended.  South Korea may have outlawed prostitution in 2004 and USFK may 
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have developed a resourceful CTIP program, but these initiatives have only 
forced the practice to become even more secretive.153  To restrict its 
personnel from continuing to seek illicit sexual services, USFK more strictly 
monitors bars and clubs in the camptowns, keeping a vigilant watch for 
establishments—specifically juicy bars—involved in trafficking and placing 
them off-limits.154  Yet their efforts have an unintended effect.155  Rather 
than keeping troops away from these establishments, off-limits lists often 
give base personnel ideas about where to find the prostitutes.156  And as for 
South Korea, the main problem remains the enforceability of its laws.157  The 
country’s legislation has certainly tightened the noose on the sex trade, but 
the apathetic and passive enforcement of these laws has stunted any 
progress.158  Even more concerning, perhaps, is that high-ranking 
government officials and social leaders flout the very laws they create,159 
setting a poor precedent for South Korea’s condemnation of the sex trade. 
As USFK’s military bases move towards consolidation, the once 
flourishing Seoul camptowns are losing critical consumers.160  This, 
however, does not mark the end of the sex trade in South Korea.  Concerns 
are now being raised about the trafficking of women around Camp 
Humphreys—a massive new base complex in Pyeongtaek—where most 
USFK personnel are being relocated.161  Durebang162 Director Kim Eun-jin 
shared her professional perspective on the move, declaring, “I bet there will 
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sex trade.” (quoting Shin Park Jin-young, president of the human rights center at the Daegu 
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 161. See Ko Dong-hwan, Sex Trade Victims’ Guardian Plans to Follow US Troops to 
Pyeongtaek, KOREA TIMES (Aug. 28, 2018, 4:11 PM), https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/ 
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be another entertainment district formed near those camps, just as it has been 
around American military camps across the country, with all those women 
suffering as a result of human trafficking.”163  Unfortunately, this already 
appears to be happening.  A new off-limits list has been issued for base 
personnel stationed at Camp Humphreys, pinpointing establishments 
notorious for prostitution and sex trafficking, reminiscent of other 
installations in South Korea.164  USFK can hope that making Camp 
Humphreys a more family-centered base will help combat the sex trade,165 
but the presence of families has never deterred it in the past.166  The problem 
is that U.S. military men will continue to solicit the sexual services of women 
wherever the base is located167 if a supply is available. 
III.  RE(SEOUL)UTION AND BEYOND 
The economic, political, and cultural entrenchment of U.S. military bases 
overseas indicates that there is no simple solution for eradicating sex 
trafficking near these military installations.  Indeed, South Korea is only one 
of the many countries touched by this issue.  What is required to ameliorate 
the situation is a nuanced and targeted solution specific to each country in 
which the United States maintains a military base.  Such a solution will 
require increased efforts from both the United States and host countries to 
eliminate trafficking culture around U.S. overseas military bases.  This 
section thus proposes a solution for greater cooperation and enforceability in 
creating guidelines and signing SOFAs concerning sex trafficking.  As 
flexible documents that not only necessitate party participation in the 
negotiation process but also last indefinitely, SOFAs can provide a workable 
and more permanent means through which to promulgate sex trafficking 
regulations. 
Part III.A discusses the legal feasibility of amending existing SOFAs and 
drafting new ones to include provisions regulating sex trafficking.  Using the 
U.S.-South Korea SOFA as an example, this section explores how 
environmental protection—an emerging human rights issue—has long been 
incorporated into such agreements.168  This existing precedent should pave 
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the way for the inclusion of an additional human rights concern in SOFAs:  
sex trafficking.  Part III.B then considers the practical impact of the solution 
and why using SOFAs to combat sex trafficking can have the specific and 
desirable effect of severing the connection between sex trafficking and U.S. 
military bases overseas. 
A.  The Legal Feasibility of Including Sex Trafficking Regulations in SOFAs 
Recently, there has been increased interest in the debate over whether the 
United States should close its foreign military bases altogether, and part of 
this discourse stems from the human rights violations being perpetrated by 
U.S. personnel overseas.169  The solution to eliminate abuses caused by 
overseas military installations is to simply get rid of the bases, which would 
severely limit the ability of U.S. military personnel to commit heinous crimes 
abroad, including sex trafficking.  Yet America’s overseas bases are largely 
considered necessary for U.S. foreign policy,170 and countries continue to 
solicit military aid from the United States.171  Shutting down U.S. bases 
overseas, then, seems impracticable. 
A more modest solution is to find a means to prevent the crimes associated 
with U.S. base personnel overseas.  This can be achieved by modifying the 
very agreements that allow overseas bases to exist in the first place:  SOFAs.  
As contracts, SOFAs may be amended.172  Indeed, the flexibility afforded to 
countries in designing and amending SOFAs is advantageous for both 
addressing and resolving key issues such as sex trafficking.  Based on 
negotiations between the United States and host countries, SOFAs are drafted 
to anticipate the legal issues that arise when American service members 
commit crimes outside of U.S. jurisdiction.173  Additionally, nothing 
currently forbids the inclusion of human rights concerns in SOFAs.  
Therefore, existing SOFAs must adapt to the changing times. 
As an example, South Korea modified its SOFA with the United States to 
address environmental concerns after U.S. military personnel dumped toxic 
chemicals into the Han River, igniting a storm of protest.174  As one Korean 
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citizen angrily shared, “[t]he SOFA has allowed American soldiers to get 
away with committing offenses here.”175  The event sparked a legal battle176 
between the U.S. military and local authorities, resulting in an amended 
SOFA.177  The agreement now reads:   
The United States Government and the Republic of Korea Government 
recognize and acknowledge the importance of environmental protection in 
the context of defense activities in the Republic of Korea under the Mutual 
Defense Treaty of 1953.  The United States Government commits itself to 
implementing this Agreement in a manner consistent with the protection of 
the natural environment and human health, and confirms its policy to 
respect relevant Republic of Korea Government environmental laws, 
regulations, and standards.  The Republic of Korea Government confirms 
its policy to implement its environmental laws, regulations, and standards 
with due regard for the health and safety of United States personnel.178 
The amended agreement reflects a cooperative model that lays out the 
responsibilities of both the U.S. and South Korean governments to address 
environmental concerns, which were absent in the original SOFA.179  Human 
rights issues can similarly be negotiated into SOFAs, especially when they 
raise concerns over the actions of American service members and their 
resulting impact on the lives of Korean residents. 
A SOFA amendment addressing sex trafficking would be similar to one 
imposing a responsibility to care for the environment.  By adapting the SOFA 
to include the environmental amendment, USFK has shown its commitment 
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to addressing environmental concerns.180  And while the U.S. military has 
repeatedly pledged to eradicate sex trafficking,181 it has not similarly 
demonstrated its commitment through a SOFA amendment targeting sex 
trafficking.  Rather than having multiple unenforceable documents 
purporting to address the U.S. military’s sex trafficking crisis, the logical 
solution would be to include a sex trafficking provision in one document.  
Memorializing such terms in the SOFA itself would allow all policy to exist 
in one place and have a specific and targeted solution for the United States 
and the host country. 
What would ultimately give rise to problems are the differences in the legal 
approaches to combatting sex trafficking between the United States and host 
countries.  Certain crimes that the United States considers particularly 
egregious may not be considered so by the local governments, and vice versa.  
It is not uncommon for the SOFA to become a hot-button issue after U.S. 
personnel allegedly commit crimes in many host countries with large foreign 
military presences.182  This is particularly the case when the incident involves 
sex crimes and the United States and the host country define the charge 
differently. 
Considering these differences, it is imperative that each SOFA between 
the United States and a host country has its own specialized definition of sex 
trafficking.  This definition can easily incorporate the definition from the 
Palermo Protocol,183 the United States’184 or host country’s definition of sex 
trafficking, or a hybrid.  Finalizing a definition for sex trafficking will require 
extensive negotiations between the United States and the host country, but 
cooperation is ultimately key.185  Indeed, the United States has been working 
to strengthen its partnership—the “4th P”—with other countries in its 
mission to eliminate sex trafficking around the world, as illustrated in its 
Strategic Action Plan.186  Working with another country to find a mutually 
agreed-upon legal definition for sex trafficking only further promotes the 
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partnership prong.  Because the definition will be written into SOFAs, both 
the United States and host countries will be accountable for any violation 
against the agreed-upon language.  Not only does this stop the United States 
from imposing its own sex trafficking legislation on sovereign states but it 
also is quintessential of the 4th P. 
After formulating a collaborative definition for sex trafficking, there 
remains the hurdle of who will prosecute the crime.  Once U.S. military 
personnel step off base, they are on foreign soil, and the host country may 
have the power to prosecute any crimes they commit, depending on the 
jurisdictional framework of the SOFA.187  In the spirit of maintaining 
peaceful negotiation for an infraction of the sex trafficking provision of the 
SOFA, it is impracticable to grant the United States exclusive jurisdiction.188  
Instead, the United States and the host country should share jurisdiction over 
sex trafficking crimes.189  In this scenario, shared jurisdiction would allow 
the host country to have the first opportunity to prosecute the crime.  Since 
the crime is being committed outside the jurisdictional control of the United 
States, the host country should therefore have the power to try the offender.  
If the host country declines to exercise jurisdiction, the responsibility of 
prosecution will then fall to the United States. 
Even if a U.S. soldier is tried by the host country, SOFAs dictate that he 
may still be afforded certain guarantees for a fair trial similar to those of 
criminal defendants in the United States.190  Indeed, a U.S. soldier is typically 
appointed a SOFA representative—“[a]n observer from the same Military 
Service as the accused”—to attend his trial and act to protect his 
constitutional rights,191 including the right to counsel and the right to an 
interpreter.192  While the host country may not recognize an equivalent of 
U.S. constitutional rights, the SOFA typically stipulates what rights U.S. 
military personnel are entitled to in criminal trials.193  If tried by the United 
States, a U.S. soldier is subject to the UCMJ.194  While the United States 
remains one of the global leaders in protecting and promoting human 
rights,195 the host country should still have primary jurisdiction for the 
aforementioned reasons. 
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B.  The Practical Impact of Using SOFAs to Combat Sex Trafficking 
Around U.S. Military Bases Abroad 
The United States has not been able to single-handedly stop the sex 
trafficking of women and girls around its military bases overseas.  The 
presence of U.S. armed forces should not be a contributing factor to crime 
that will harm the residents of another nation, especially when they are 
stationed overseas to protect that country’s interests.  Additionally, the host 
country should not be obligated to follow the unilateral laws set by the United 
States when it is its own sovereign state and the U.S. military base is on 
foreign soil.  Allowing the United States and the host country to contribute 
to a definition for sex trafficking not only makes both parties more willing to 
adhere to their own laws but also entices them to honor the commitment they 
made.  While an argument could be made that there is the possibility of one 
country having greater influence over creating the definition, ultimately both 
the United States and the host country must execute the agreement.  If one 
country is dissatisfied with the terms, it is unlikely to ratify the document 
without further negotiation.  Therefore, cooperation will ensure a balance 
between the two countries’ interests. 
The same logic applies to the jurisdictional framework regarding sex 
trafficking in SOFAs.  Here, the U.S. base exists only because the sovereign 
state has allowed its presence and location.  The United States should 
therefore honor the host country’s choice of whether it wants to prosecute the 
crime or relinquish jurisdiction to the United States.  If the host country 
decides to exercise its jurisdiction, this will serve as a powerful psychological 
deterrent to U.S. military personnel seeking to indulge in sex trafficking 
because they understand that they may be incarcerated in a foreign prison.196  
In any case, if the host country declines jurisdiction, then the United States 
will have the opportunity to prosecute the crime itself. 
The United States has undeniably demonstrated its commitment to the 
global eradication of sex trafficking.  But it is not always clear whether the 
host country has the same intention.  Although the host country should be 
inclined to protect its citizens’ human rights, this moral obligation may not 
be enough to entice them into incorporating a sex trafficking provision in the 
SOFA.  If the host country is altogether apathetic to this issue, the United 
States could condition its military presence in the state on the host country’s 
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cooperation regarding sex trafficking.197  The minimum effort that a host 
country should contribute would be the drafting of a definition of sex 
trafficking for the SOFA, considering that the United States will prosecute 
any crime over which the host country declines to exercise jurisdiction. 
To replace the United States’ multitudinous SOFAs with various countries, 
the United States recently developed a “global SOFA template” to govern its 
foreign bases overseas.198  The global SOFA template does not include a sex 
trafficking provision but, even if it did, it would be nearly impossible to apply 
a global definition to every country.  Indeed, a global definition—most likely 
drafted by the United States alone—would neither accurately depict nor 
resolve how the U.S. military’s sex trafficking crisis affects each country.  
For example, a solution designed to target the sex trafficking of women and 
girls in South Korea may not work for the type of sex trafficking that occurs 
around a military base in a different nation; in this case, one size does not fit 
all.  Therefore, it is of utmost importance for the success of each SOFA that 
the document retains its flexibility and is tailored to the needs and conditions 
of the host country. 
Today, this issue is more pertinent than ever.  In a male-dominated world 
with a male-dominated culture, the continuous empowerment of women and 
girls and the recognition of their autonomy has important implications for the 
future.199  Because sex trafficking disproportionately affects women and 
girls, the illegal industry not only undermines gender equality but also 
perpetuates a culture of toxic masculinity—especially when the solicitation 
of sexual services stems from U.S. military men.  Indeed, the “macho” male 
culture that is often associated with the U.S. military will only continue to be 
fed by the exploitation of women and girls who are powerless over their own 
bodies.  Masculinity is no longer an excuse. 
Sex trafficking undoubtedly contributes to the vicious cycle of male 
dominance, which is yet another reason why its elimination is of paramount 
importance.  With respect to the sex trafficking of women and girls around 
U.S. military bases overseas, a strong SOFA provision would likely deter 
these men from participating in the sex industry and, consequently, prevent 
 
 197. See supra note 6 (discussing why host countries desire U.S. military presence).  It has 
been scientifically proven that better results are achieved when punishment is given rather 
than reward. See Gaia Remerowski, Carrot or Stick?:  Punishments May Guide Behavior 
More Effectively Than Rewards, SOURCE (May 6, 2015), https://source.wustl.edu/2015/05/ 
carrot-or-stick-punishments-may-guide-behavior-more-effectively-than-rewards 
[https://perma.cc/G4LU-LZBD].  The United States could therefore punish the host country 
for refusing to comply, such as by reducing the number of military personnel or cutting back 
on financial aid. 
 198. See INT’L SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 5, at 3–5.  A standardized SOFA would be 
far too rigid for a document that requires flexibility. Id. 
 199. The empowerment of women has blossomed in the United States following the 
#MeToo movement. See, e.g., Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful 
Men.  Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html 
[https://perma.cc/E3UA-7N53].  While the movement continues to gain traction, turning a 
blind eye to the sex trafficking of women and girls runs counter to any progress the United 
States has made in advancing women’s rights and equality. 
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them from reinforcing gender inequality.  Additionally, this will further give 
decline to a “macho” military culture that, above all, breeds promiscuous 
behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
Right now, there are insufficient procedures in place to permit the vigorous 
prosecution of sex trafficking offenses involving U.S. military personnel 
overseas.  The United States can continue to unilaterally promulgate 
legislation and policy, but these one-sided laws will always fail to adequately 
address the issue at hand.  Existing legislation and policy prove the point.  
While the TVPA, NSPD 22, and the Strategic Action Plan all strive to 
eliminate sex trafficking, they fall short of being able to grasp the nuances 
necessary for the elimination of sex trafficking around the U.S. military bases 
located on foreign soil.  Here, a sex trafficking solution that works for one 
country may not be applicable to another.  Therefore, SOFAs can serve as 
the fundamental building blocks for the creation of a solution that will sever 
the connection between sex trafficking and U.S. military personnel in a 
specific host country.  The agreed-upon definition of sex trafficking and the 
proposed jurisdictional framework underlie the importance of the United 
States and the host country working together to effectively target the many 
forms of sex trafficking around U.S. military bases.  Such a resolution will 
ultimately allow the military to state that it finally has a handle on criminal 
sexual activities that stem from the actions of its very own personnel, 
bringing the United States one step closer to eliminating sex trafficking on a 
global scale. 
